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Abstract 
In this paper, we address the question whether family support via the income tax system is 
more generous in France than in Germany, as it is often claimed in the public debate. We use 
two micro-data sets and a micro-simulation model to compare effective average tax rates for 
different household types in France and Germany. Our analysis shows that the popular belief 
that French high income families with children face lower average tax rates than their German 
counterparts is true, however not due to the French Family splitting but rather to the different 
definitions of taxable incomes in both countries. Actually, low income families with less than 
three children even fare better in terms of tax relief in Germany than in France. The French 
system leads to lower average tax rates than the German one (over a large range of the income 
distribution) only for families with three children. 
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1 Introduction 
The treatment of households of different size within the income tax system has been widely 
discussed, both in the academic as well as in the public debate. In times of declining fertility 
rates, family policy has shifted more and more into the centre of the public discussion. One 
example for this development is Germany with one of the lowest fertility rates in Europe, 
although compared to other countries, a relatively large amount of public funds is spent on 
family policy measures.1 In addition to the low fertility rate in general, the low employment of 
mothers as well as the low fertility of highly educated women is often also seen as an emerg-
ing problem.2 Reforms of the treatment of marriage and children within the income tax system 
have often been proposed as measures which could influence both fertility and work incen-
tives for mothers. 
In contrast to Germany, neighbouring France seems to have reached both, a high fertility rate 
and high maternal employment levels (see, among others, Fagnani 2001 or Letablier 2003). In 
German public opinion, the French “family splitting” is seen as one important reason why 
French family policy performs better than its German counterpart, and there are many  propo-
nents of the introduction of a family splitting in Germany throughout all political parties. 
While some proponents see the family splitting as a way to allocate more money to families 
with children,3 others even hope to abolish the strong disincentive to work for secondary 
earners under the existing income splitting for married partners (“Ehegattensplitting”).4 How-
ever, it follows from economic theory that any sort of joint taxation has negative implications 
on the work incentives for secondary earners, no matter what splitting procedure is applied. 
The fact that a family splitting for Germany would not affect the labor supply of married 
women has also been shown empirically (see Beblo et al. 2004 and Althammer 2000). In our 
analysis, we want to focus on the first argument, namely ask if it is true that the French family 
splitting allocates more money to families with children than the treatment of children in the 
German income tax does. 
                                                                          
1 In the election campaign of 2005, the Social Democrats as well as the Conservatives saw family policy as a core 
issue in their campaigns. The conservatives proposed an increase of the tax allowance for children, while the 
Social Democrats were in favour of reforming parental leave benefits. 
2 However, Schmitt and Winkelmann (2005) show that the often cited hypotheses of below-average fertility of high 
skilled women in Germany is not found in the data. 
3 See, among others, newspaper articles in the German dailies “Die Welt” (“Der Rabenstaat”, July 5
th 2004), “Die 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung” („Familien sind um ein Vielfaches höher belastet als Singles“, February 15
th 2005), and 
the weekly „Die Zeit“ („Die Mitte im Blick“, Nr. 42/2005).  
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To be precise, we will analyze the effects of both income tax systems and all their family 
components, i.e. the family splitting in France and the tax allowance for children in Germany, 
as well as child benefits in both countries. In a first step, we will analyze the tax schedule and 
the tax treatment of children, which together yields a distribution of “theoretical” average tax 
rates. However, since the concept of taxable income differs substantially between the two 
countries, we will, in a next step, have a closer look at the definitions of taxable income and 
its distribution in France and Germany. For this purpose, we use two representative micro 
data sets and a microsimulation model. Based on these data, we can calculate effective aver-
age tax rates independently from any arbitrary definition of taxable income. We then compare 
the shape of these effective tax rate profiles across households with a varying number of chil-
dren as well as differences in effective tax rates between the two countries. It should be 
stressed at this point that we are not so much concerned with the over-all distribution of net 
incomes in both countries. For an analysis of this type, we would also have to include all sorts 
of government transfers in both countries such as social assistance, housing allowances etc. 
We are explicitly interested in the effect of the two different income tax systems only. 
There is a large body of literature on comparative analysis of income tax systems in general, 
and the treatment of marriage and children in particular. In most of the studies, average tax 
rates for “representative households” are shown (see, among others, OECD 2002 and Parsche 
and Osterkamp 2004). Although interesting as sort of summarized information, these studies 
necessarily remain a rough approximation. First of all, the empirical distribution of incomes 
and characteristics over the whole population is not taken into account. Second, the different 
definitions of taxable incomes are also not considered in much detail. Only a few studies 
compare effective average tax rates across countries using micro data and microsimulation 
techniques (see O’Donoghue and Sutherland 1999, Immervoll 2004 and Corak et al. 2005), 
however, none of them focuses on a comparison between France and Germany.  
Another part of the literature, especially in Germany, is concerned with the distributional and 
employment effects of a reform of the German income splitting for married partners towards> 
the French family splitting. Beblo et al. (2004) and Althammer (2000) use microsimulation 
models to impose the French family splitting on the German tax base and tax schedule and 
analyze the effects on income distribution and work incentives. They find, however, that such 
                                                                          
4 See, among others, article in “Die Zeit” (“Die Mitte im Blick”, Nr. 42/2005)  
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a reform would only lead to minor effects with respect to both, income distribution as well as 
work incentives. 
Our results are very much in line with these findings. However, since we are using data-sets 
from both countries and, in addition to the comparison of tax schedules and the treatment of 
children, also analyze the different definitions and distributions of taxable income, we are 
able to draw conclusions about the profiles of effective average tax rates in both countries. 
We find that the popular belief that French high income families with children face lower 
average tax rates than Germans is true, however not due to the Family splitting but due to the 
different definition of taxable income. The redistributive power of the Family splitting in 
France is limited due to the ceiling of the family splitting gain. The French system results in 
lower average tax rates than the German one (over a large range of incomes) only for families 
with three children. 
2  Definitions of basic concepts 
Before we start with the description of the institutional details in both countries, we will for-
mally define concepts used in the following analysis. In particular, we want to be precise 
about what we understand as tax schedule, tax base function, taxable income and the progres-
sivity of an income tax system.  
Let pre-tax income be denoted as Y and any family characteristics such as marital status, 
number and age of children as X. Then a tax base function f is any function f(Y,X) that trans-
forms pre-tax income Y into taxable income Z. The tax schedule t(Z,X) is then applied to this 
taxable income, yielding the tax liability T. Note that in both steps, household characteristics 
(X) may intervene. Family components of an income tax system might be implemented in the 
tax base function, such as the child allowance (“Kinderfreibetrag”) in Germany. Cash benefits 
such as child benefits in France and Germany would be part of the tax schedule, since they 
lower the tax liability, which can even become negative in the presence of child benefits and 
low pre-tax incomes. The overall tax system thus consists of the tax schedule function and the 
tax base function. 
The progressivity of an income tax system is closely related to the concept of average effec-
tive tax rates. The average effective tax rate is the tax liability of a tax unit divided by its pre-
tax income, i.e. T/Y. An income tax system is called progressive if the effective average tax  
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rate is an increasing function of pre-tax income Y. In our analysis, we will often plot the effec-
tive average tax rates for different household types, i.e. for different values of X. Clearly, 
focusing only at T/Z eludes part of the characteristics of a tax system, especially when the tax 
base function f(Y, X) is very different across countries. Nevertheless, we will also look at the 
shape of “theoretical” average tax rates T/Z, in order to differentiate between the impact of 
the tax base function f(.) and the tax schedule t(.) in both countries. 
Comparing effective average tax rates across countries for different household types allows to 
draw conclusions about the redistribution due to income taxation between households of the 
same size. If one wants to gain insights at horizontal distribution, however, one may have to 
look at how average tax rates profiles differ between households of different sizes. Since the 
average tax burden across households differs between France and Germany, we will compare 
the difference between the effective average tax rate profile of each household type and the 
median of the effective average tax rate across all households in each country. 
3 Institutional  setting 
This section provides a description of the income tax system in Germany and France, as far as 
the tax schedule and the family components are concerned. We will see that the two systems 
are very similar in the way adults are treated but differ considerably with respect to the treat-
ment of children. The definition of taxable income also differs between the two countries. The 
year of reference is 2001, since this is the most recent year for which datasets for both coun-
tries, which we need for the empirical analysis later on, are available. Since 2001, income 
taxes have been modified both in France and Germany. These reforms lead top marginal tax 
rates in both countries to fall significantly. Nonetheless, the basic mechanisms of the two 
systems with regard to the treatment of families have remained the same since 2001.5 
                                                                          
5 In Germany, the top marginal rate was reduced by 6.5 percentage points, from 48.5% in 2001 to 42% in 2005. 
The starting rate was also reduced, from 19.9% to 15%. The basic allowance was increased from 7,206 to 7,664 
Euro (see Haan and Steiner 2005). In France, both the top marginal tax rate and the starting rate were reduced in 
the year 2005, from 52.75% to 39.1% and from 7.5 to 6.83%, respectively.  In the same year, the basic allowance 
was increased from 4,121 to 4,334 Euro per year.   
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3.1  The tax schedule for a single person in France and Germany 
France and Germany have similar tax schedules, as is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. In both 
countries, there is a basic allowance that is meant to guarantee a tax-free minimum income. In 
2001, this basic allowance was higher in Germany (7,206 Euro per year) than in France 
(4,121 Euro per year), however, the starting rate was significantly lower in France (7.5%) 
than in Germany (19.9%). The top marginal rate was slightly lower in Germany (48.5%) than 
in France (52.75%). Moreover, the top bracket started earlier in France. Although the shape of 
the marginal tax rates looks different in France and Germany, a comparison of the “theoreti-
cal” average tax rate shows that the schedules are in fact very similar. At a taxable income of 
10,000 Euro per year, the average tax rate amounts to 6% in Germany and to about 7% in 
France; a taxable income of 20,000 Euro is on average taxed at 16% in Germany and at 17% 
in France. All in all, the “theoretical” average tax rates increases at a higher rate in France 
than in Germany. At a taxable income of 55,000 Euro, which lies in the top tax bracket in 
both countries, the average tax rate amounts to 31% in Germany and to 35% in France. This 
implies that the tax schedule in France is designed to be more progressive than in Germany 
for the largest part of the range of taxable income. However, we want to stress at this point, 
that the progressivity of the tax schedule does not allow any conclusion about the overall 
distributional effects of the income tax system, since the schedule is defined on taxable in-
come. As will be shown later on, the definitions of taxable income differ considerably be-
tween the two countries. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
3.2  Taking marriage into account 
In both France and Germany, the tax unit of the personal income tax is the household, i.e. 
either a single individual or a married couple. Married couples6 are eligible to income split-
ting, which leads to a lower tax burden for married people as soon as the tax schedule is pro-
gressive and incomes are unequally distributed within the household. Formally, the calcula-
tion of a household’s tax liability T in the presence of income splitting can be written as: 
                                                                          
6 In France, not only married couples but also spouses or two other people who signed the PACS (‘Pacte civil de 












      ( 1 )    
where wi is the income of household member i, t(.) is the tax schedule and k is the “splitting 
divisor”. For married couples without dependent children, the splitting divisor k equals 2 in 
both countries. Compared to the tax liability that would result if the two spouses filed sepa-
rately, income splitting leads to a so-called “splitting gain”. This gain is a non-decreasing 
function of income disparity within the couple and also depends on taxable income. It reaches 
its maximum for single-earner couples with a taxable household income higher than 110,000 
Euro per year and amounts to 10,000 Euro per year in the case of the German tax schedule of 
the year 2001 (see also Steiner and Wrohlich 2004). In France the maximum is reached at 
about 90,000 Euro and also amounts to about 10,000 Euro. Figures 3 and 4 show the “split-
ting gain” as a function of taxable household income and the income distribution within the 
couple. The shape of the “splitting gain” is very similar in both countries, which is due to the 
similar shape of the “theoretical” average tax rates in France and Germany. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
3.3 Taking  children into account 
As has been shown above, both the tax schedule and the treatment of married couples are 
similar in the French and German tax systems. The treatment of children, however, differs 
significantly between the two countries. In Germany, every child gets a child benefit (“Kin-
dergeld”) that amounted to 1,656 Euro per year (in 2001) for the first and the second, 1,848 
Euro for the third and 2,148 Euro for the fourth and every subsequent child. Moreover, there 
is a tax allowance (“Kinderfreibetrag”) for every child amounting to 5,112 Euro per year. 
Child benefit and tax allowance, however, are not granted jointly, rather a so-called higher-
yield test is applied: If the amount of tax saved by means of the tax allowance is higher than 
the amount of the child benefit, then the tax allowance is applied. In the case of families with 
one child, in 2001 the reduction in the tax burden by means of the tax allowance was larger 
than the amount of the child benefit for annual taxable incomes of 55,000 euro and upwards, 
which is about 17% of all families eligible to child benefits or child allowances in Germany.  
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The maximum amount of relief by means of the tax allowance was obtained in that year by 
families with a taxable income of over 110,000 Euro, for whom it amounted to almost 2,500 
euro per child per annum (see also Althammer 2002).  
In France, parents are also paid a child benefit (“Allocations familiales”), but only from the 
second child onward. In contrast to Germany, the amount of the benefit depends on the age of 
the child. For young children, the child benefit amounted to 1,248 Euro per year for the sec-
ond, and 1,644 Euro per year for the third and every subsequent child. For children between 
11 and 16 years, the benefit is increased by 360 Euro per year, for children older than 16 it is 
increased by 648 per year. In addition, there is an income-tested supplement (“Complément 
familial”) for the third and every subsequent child. This supplement amounted to 1,680 Euro 
per year up to a taxable income of 24,545 Euro7 in the year 2001. Above this ceiling, the 
supplement is withdrawn linearly at a rate of 100%. Moreover, in France children also influ-
ence their parents’ tax due through the so-called “Quotient familial” or “Family splitting”. For 
the first and second child, the splitting divisor (k in equation 1) is increased by one “half 
share”, i.e. by 0.5. For the third and every subsequent child, it is increased by 1 (“full share”). 
The tax relief obtained by this family splitting has a ceiling at 2,017 Euro per half share per 
year.8 
Figures 5, 6 and 7 illustrate the “theoretical” average tax rates that are implied by the income 
tax systems and its family components in France and Germany.  
[Figure 5 about here] 
[Figure 6 about here] 
[Figure 7 about here] 
As is illustrated in Figure 5, the average tax rates for couples with one child start at negative 
values in Germany due to the child benefit. Theoretical average tax rates for this household 
type in Germany lie below the average tax rate in France over the whole distribution of tax-
able income. The difference is most pronounced at the lower bound of the distribution. This is 
due to the fact that there is no child benefit for the first child in France and the tax gain from 
the family splitting is only effective for higher incomes. Also for very high incomes – from 
                                                                          
7 For a family with three children. 
8 For a graphic depiction of the difference in absolute amounts of tax gains in France and Germany, see Wrohlich 
et al. (2005).  
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80,000 Euro onwards – the German tax allowance for children provides more relative tax gain 
than the French family splitting with its ceiling. For couples with two children as well, low 
income families face lower average tax rates in Germany than in France, as can be seen from 
Figure 6. Up to an income of about 35,000 Euro per year and above about 65,000 Euro per 
year, average tax rates are lower in Germany than in France for couples with two children. 
For couples with three children, however, the French system leads to lower average tax rates 
over a wide range of the income distribution (Figure 7). This is due to the income-tested sup-
plement to the child benefit and the fact that the splitting divisor is twice as high for the third 
child than for the second, whereas in Germany the tax allowance for children does not in-
crease for the third child. However, for families with a taxable income up to about 15,000 
Euro per year, the relative tax relief is higher in Germany than in France. 
3.4  The treatment of single parents 
The tax treatment of single parents also differs between Germany and France. In 2001, there 
has been a tax allowance for single parents amounting to 2,870 Euro per year in Germany.9 In 
France, single parents are granted a splitting divisor of 1.5, in addition to the shares that are 
granted for the children. Figure 8 illustrates the theoretical average tax rates that result from 
the tax tariff and the family components for singles with one child. Since there is no child 
benefit for the first child in France, German average tax rates lie well below the French ones 
for families with a taxable income up to about 16,000 Euro per year. Between 16,000 and 
45,000 Euro, the average tax rates are lower in France for this household type. For families in 
the upper part of the income distribution, i.e. with a taxable income of 45,000 and more, aver-
age tax rates are again lower in Germany. 
[Figure 8 about here] 
3.5  First conclusions and limits 
Table 1 summarizes the most important regulations with respect to the tax treatment of mar-
ried couples, children and single parents in France and Germany. Overall, the comparison of 
theoretical average tax rates shows that the German tax system is more generous towards low-
                                                                          
9 This tax allowance (“Haushaltsfreibetrag”) has been abolished in 2004 and replaced by another tax allowance  
(“Entlastungsbetrag”) that amounts to 1,308 Euro per year.  
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income families than the French one. At the upper end of the income distribution, German 
families face lower theoretical average tax rates than French ones, which is due to the ceiling 
of the family splitting tax gain. In fact, a family splitting system with a ceiling as imple-
mented in France has the same effect as a child allowance as implemented in Germany; in 
both cases, the tax relief has a similar pattern, its amount is only depending on the absolute 
value of the ceiling and the allowance, respectively.  
However, the differences presented here should not be over-interpreted. First, both welfare 
systems provide other benefits which, although they sometimes do not explicitly focus on 
children, nonetheless lead to very significant transfers towards families with children.10 Sec-
ondly, comparing schedules relative to taxable income can be misleading if the definition of 
taxable income differs across the two countries. Therefore, in the next section, we will have a 
closer look at the definition and the distribution of taxable incomes in France and Germany. 
[Table 1 about here] 
4  The definition and distribution of taxable income in France 
and Germany 
4.1  Three different definitions of income 
Throughout our analysis, we use three different definitions of household income, pre-tax 
income (Y), taxable income (Z) and after-tax income (Y-t(Z)). In the definitions of pre-tax and 
after-tax income, we seek for a concept that is comparable across the two countries. There-
fore, we define pre-tax income as gross market income (i.e. the sum of incomes from depend-
ent employment, self-employment, capital, rent and lease) less social security contributions 
plus unemployment benefits and pensions. In the French case, income tax includes the “impôt 
sur le revenu des personnes physiques” (IRPP), the “Contribution Sociale Généralisée” 
(CSG) and the “Contribution pour le Remboursement de la Dette Sociale” (CRDS). 11 CSG 
                                                                          
10 In France, housing allowances („Allocations logement“) are an important redistributive device. Means-tested 
benefits for lone benefits („Allocation Parent Isolé”), if added to the picture, would also certainly change the pat-
tern at the bottom of the income distribution. On the other hand, also for Germany many social transfers such as 
social assistance (“Sozialhilfe”) or housing benefits (“Wohngeld”) would change the picture.  
11 Note that in France, the social protection fund is partly financed by the “Generalized Social Contribution” (CSG, 
“Contribution Sociale Généralisée”), which is a proportional tax (7,5%) on all types of incomes, including capital 
income. The CSG has been completed since 1996 by the so-called Tax to Pay-off Social Debt (CRDS, “Contribu-
tion pour le Remboursement de la Dette Sociale”), which has approximately the same base and a rate of 0,5%. 
5.1% of the CSG can be deduced of the taxable income, therefore the remaining 2.4% are part of the taxable 
income. The CRDS is part of the taxable income. Thus, 2.9% of the pre tax income is twice taxed. Both CSG and  
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and CRDS are not properly speaking income taxes; they were designed to finance the Social 
Security system only. We see three reasons to integrate them in our analysis: first the move 
from contributions to taxes to finance the Social Security system is a general move of coun-
tries with generous welfare states which try to keep labor costs down (i.e. the cut-off line is 
moving and will move quicker in the future; second, in the French context, and as far as the 
shaping of income inequalities is concerned, ignoring the CSG (a flat tax which revenue ist 
significantly higher than that of the income tax properly speaking) would completely blur the 
general picture and overstate the progressivity of the system; third and correlatively only the 
IRPP+CSG package is comparable to the German income tax in terms of revenue (relative to 
the GDP). In Germany, the income tax (“Einkommensteuer”) and the solidarity tax (“Soli-
daritätszuschlag”)12 are included. 
After-tax income is defined as pre-tax income less income tax, plus child benefits. Child 
benefits are included in the after-tax income because in Germany, tax allowances for children 
and child benefits are not separable, both being part of the income tax system. For the sake of 
a detailed comparison of the systems in France and Germany, child benefits (“Allocations 
Familiales” and “Complément Familial”) are also added to after-tax income in France. All 
other social benefits and transfers are excluded from this definition. 
Taxable income, finally, refers to the definition given by the tax law of both countries. One of 
the most important differences between the definition of taxable income in France and Ger-
many is the treatment of unemployment benefits and pensions. While unemployment benefits 
and the larger part of pensions is not part of the taxable income in Germany, they are fully 
taxed in France.13 Further, allowable expenses also differ substantially between the two coun-
tries. In Germany, there is a lump-sum deduction that amounted to 1,044 Euro per year in 
                                                                          
CRDS were meant to be insignificant and provisional when they were introduced. They now lost both of these 
features and are an important part of French direct taxes. Being proportional, they moreover have an effect on the 
progressivity of the French tax system. We thus decided to integrate them in the “income tax” studied here. Pre-
tax income is thus measured before CSG and CRDS are paid. 
12 The German „Solidaritätszuschlag“ was first introduced in 1991 to finance the burden of the German reunifica-
tion. In 1991 and 1992 it was a proportional rate of 3,75% of the income tax (and corporate tax) liability. It was not 
charged in 1993 and 1994 and implemented again in 1995 at a rate of 7,5%. From 1998 on, it amounts to 5,5% of 
the income tax liability. 
13 In fact, unemployment benefits are not directly taxed in Germany, but included in the income tax via the so-
called „Progressionsvorbehalt“. This means that they are added to taxable income first in order to calculate the 
average tax rate, which is then applied to taxable income excluding unemployment benefits only. Furthermore, 
pensions are not fully taxed in Germany, but only to the extent of their profit share (“Ertragsanteil”), which is 
defined as amounting to 32% of pensions received from the 60
th birthday onwards and 27% of pensions received 
from the 65
th birthday onwards. In 2005, the profit share of pensions was increased to 50% for all pensions and 
will be linearly increasing until it reaches 100% in the next decades.  
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2001 (“Werbungskostenpauschbetrag”), while in France, every employee is granted an allow-
ance as high as 28% of gross income from employment.  
Another important difference is the treatment of social security contributions: In France, they 
are not part of taxable income at all, while in Germany, only part of them are deductible 
(“Vorsorgepauschale”) and calculated following a non-linear function decreasing in income 
and dependent on marital status.14  
From this short overview of the most important differences in the definition of taxable income 
in France and Germany, one can already infer the different effects on the progressivity of the 
overall income tax system in both countries. The fact that the larger part of unemployment 
benefits and pensions are not taxed in Germany while they are fully taxed in France, is ex-
pected to increase the progressivity of the income tax in Germany as compared to France. The 
same effect is to be expected from the different treatment of social security contributions. 
Finally, also the fact that allowable expenses are proportional to income in France while there 
is a lump-sum amount in Germany, should affect the progressivity in the same way. In the 
following, we will compare the distribution of pre-tax income and taxable income in both 
countries. We believe that this is an important intermediate step on the way to the analysis of 
effective average tax rates that will be presented in section 5.  
4.2  Description of the data  
In the following empirical analysis, we use survey data from France and Germany for in-
comes earned in 2001. For France, we use the “Taxable Income Survey” 2001 (ERF, “En-
quête Revenus Fiscaux”). This survey is based on the French Labor Force Survey, which is a 
representative sample of private households living in France containing information on ap-
proximately 75,000 households. The ERF matches respondents from the Labor Force Survey 
with their income tax returns, which are provided by the French tax administration (DGI, 
“Direction Générale des Impôts”). For Germany we use the 2002 wave of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), which is a representative panel study of private households living in 
Germany. In the year 2002, which contains information on incomes earned in 2001, about 
                                                                          
14 Single individuals with a gross income from employment of 10,000 Euro per year can deduct 100% of their 
social security contributions; at an income of 20,000 Euro it is 48% and at 50,000 Euro it is 20% of social security 
contributions they can deduct. For a married couple with a joint gross income of employment as high as 20,000 
Euro per year, it is still 100% they can deduct, at a joint income of 50,000 Euro, it is 41%.  
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12,000 households participated in the survey.15 We decided to use the SOEP instead of the 
German Income Tax Statistics for two reasons. First of all, the most recent micro data of the 
Income Tax Statistics in Germany currently are for the year 1998. Second, in Germany, not 
all tax-payers are obliged to file a tax returns due to the pay-as-you-earn system for employ-
ees. Therefore, in the German Income Tax Statistics certain groups, especially single and low-
income employees or employees who do not claim itemized deductions that are not already 
taken into account by their wage tax, are underrepresented (see Bach et al. 2005). 
The French dataset includes all three definitions of incomes as defined above. The SOEP, 
however only includes information on gross and net incomes. Therefore, we make use of the 
tax-benefit microsimulation model STSM and simulate the income variables as defined 
above.16 One should keep in mind that the French dataset has characteristics which could bias 
the comparison: Relying on tax returns, it may have a different tendency to underreport in-
comes than the interview based SOEP. This different tendency can at least be assessed in the 
case of capital incomes which are often tax exempt in France (or subject to a proportional tax 
schedule in the case of fix income assets, so called “Prélèvement libératoire”). The French 
data we use thus may have a tendency to understate top incomes in comparison with German 
data. Note that the effective tax rates are nonetheless correct. 
Both surveys contain detailed information on income, working hours, family structure and 
other socio-economic variables. For our analysis, we differentiate between households of 
different size. In particular, we focus on six different household types, namely singles with no 
children and singles with one child17, couples with zero, one, two and three children. The 
distribution of different household types in Germany and France are given in Table 2. Note 
that we exclude all households that cannot be classified into one of these household types, e.g. 
because more than two adults (with or without children) are living together. Moreover, we 
exclude households that only consist of students and households with negative incomes from 
rent and lease. 
[Table 2 about here] 
                                                                          
15 For more information on the SOEP, see www.diw.de/sop and Schupp and Wagner (2002). 
16 For a detailed documentation of the tax-benefit model STSM, see (Steiner et al. 2005). 
17 We decided not to analyze the effects for singles with two children because of the small number of observa-
tions in the German dataset – see Table 2.  
 14
The most frequent household type in both countries is “single without children”, followed by 
“couple without children”. A couple household is defined as two spouses, married or cohabit-
ing, living together. A child is defined as a person who is either the biological or the adopted 
child of at least one of the spouses and not older than 27 years. Children older than 27 years 
who are still living in the same household as their parents are simply ignored in our analysis. 
This means that, e.g., a married couple living with a 24 and a 29 year old child is counted as a 
couple household with one child. The reason for this rather arbitrary cut-off is that in the 
German income tax system, child benefits or allowances are granted maximum until the 27
th 
birthday of a dependent child (if the child is still a student). 
4.3  The distribution of pre-tax and taxable income in France and 
Germany 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of pre-tax and taxable income in France and Germany for the 
whole population. The distribution of pre-tax income is very similar in both countries, in fact, 
one can hardly see any difference in the graph. At the lower end of the income distribution, 
pre-tax income in France is slightly higher than in Germany, while at the upper end, pre-tax 
income is slightly lower than in Germany. Compared to the distribution of pre-tax incomes, 
the distribution of taxable income differs considerably in France and Germany. Since unem-
ployment benefits and pensions are fully part of taxable income in France but not in Germany, 
taxable income in Germany lies below taxable income in France in the first four deciles. In 
the upper part of the income distribution, however German taxable incomes lie well above the 
French ones, which is due to the differences in deductible expenses and social security contri-
butions. 
[Figure 9 about here] 
Figures 10 and 11 show the income distributions of pre-tax and taxable incomes for different 
household types. For singles and couples without children, taxable income is lower up to the 
sixth decile in Germany than in France; in the upper three deciles, taxable income is substan-
tially higher in Germany. For households with children, this pattern is less pronounced. For 
all couples with children, taxable income in Germany lies above taxable income in France 
over the whole range of the distribution, and the difference between the distributions in Ger-
many and France is increasing with higher incomes. 
[Figure 10 about here]  
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[Figure 11 about here] 
From what we have presented up to now, we know that, (i) the tax schedule is similar in the 
two countries, although somewhat more progressive in France than in Germany for certain 
ranges of the income distribution, (ii) the distribution of pre-tax incomes is very similar in 
both countries and (iii) the distribution of taxable income is more “equal” in France than in 
Germany, which could weaken the progressivity of the French income tax system as com-
pared to the German one. In the next section, we will show how these effects add up to the 
shape of effective average tax rates in the two countries. 
5  A comparison of effective average tax rates in France and 
Germany 
As has been pointed out in section 2, effective average tax rates, defined as the tax liability 
less child benefits (T) over pre-tax income (Y), is the result of (i) the tax schedule, (ii) the 
definition of taxable income and (iii) the family components of the tax system. In this section, 
we compare effective average tax rates in France and Germany. We start with the case of 
single persons without children. From looking at the tax schedule only (Figures 1 and 2), we 
would expect the French average tax rate to lie above the German rate for most of the part of 
the income distribution and also have a steeper slope, therefore being more progressive. How-
ever, Figure 12 shows that the opposite is true: Effective average tax rates in Germany are 
higher throughout the income distribution than in France and moreover, they increase at a 
higher rate than in France for a large range of the income distribution, resulting in more pro-
gressivity. Obviously, this is due to the different definitions of taxable incomes.   
[Figure 12 about here] 
For single parents with one child, the picture of effective average tax rates (see Figure 13) 
also differs from the distribution of “theoretical” average tax rates as shown in Figure 8. As 
expected, the effective average tax rate for this household type is negative in Germany for low 
incomes due to the child benefit. German effective average tax rates lie below the French ones 
for more than 80% of all households of this type. Only for households in the highest two dec-
iles, the average tax rate is lower in France than in Germany, although the theoretical average 
tax rates in Germany lie below the French one for incomes higher than 45,000 Euro per year. 
This again is a result of the different definitions of taxable income.   
 16
[Figure 13 about here] 
Couples with one child also face negative effective average tax rates at the bottom of the 
income distribution in Germany. As can be seen in Figure 14, for 60% of all couples with one 
child, effective average tax rates are lower in Germany than in France. It is interesting, how-
ever, that for annual pre-tax incomes above 36,000 Euro per year, the effective average tax 
rate in Germany lies above the average tax rate in France – which was not expected when 
comparing the theoretical average tax rates (see Figure 5). Note also that the average tax rate 
for this group is increasing at a higher rate in Germany, which shows that the income tax is 
more progressive in Germany than in France. We also find the same pattern for couples with 
two children: For annual pre-tax incomes of 40,000 Euro and more, the average tax rate in 
Germany is considerably higher than in France (see Figure 15), which we would not have 
expected from the shape of theoretical average tax rates (see Figure 6).  
[Figure 14 about here] 
[Figure 15 about here] 
Couples with three children face negative effective average tax rates at the lower half of the 
income distribution in both countries. As can be seen from Figure 16, 60% of all couples with 
three children in Germany and 70% in France do not pay taxes at all. For all other households, 
average tax rates are higher in Germany than in France, which was expected (at least for in-
comes as high as 105,000 Euro per year) from the distribution of theoretical average tax rates 
(see Figure 7). 
[Figure 16 about here] 
Based on the evidence presented here, we come to a first conclusion at this point: It is true 
that compared to the German case, families with high incomes, i.e. those being in the upper 
two deciles of the income distribution, face a lower tax burden in France. However, in con-
trast to what is usually referred to in the public debate, for families with less than three chil-
dren, this is not due to the family splitting but to the different definitions of taxable income in 
the two countries. This can be seen from the “theoretical”average tax rates shown in Figures 5 
to 8. Only for high income families with three children, the family splitting per se already 
leads to a lower effective average tax rate over a wide range of income. However, this effect 
is strengthened by the way taxable income is defined in France as compared to Germany. At 
the same time – and this is usually not mentioned in the public debate – low income and mid- 
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dle class families (up to the sixth decile in the case of couples with children and up the eigth 
decile in the case of singles with one child) the German system implies lower average tax 
rates than the French, while households without children face higher average tax rates in 
Germany than in France throughout the whole income distribution. 
6  Some facts on horizontal redistribution 
Up to now, we have shown that between households of the same size, the income tax system 
in Germany results in more redistribution due to its more progressive structure than in France. 
Another interesting question is whether one of the two systems leads to more horizontal redis-
tribution than the other. In particular, we want to analyze if it is true that there is more redis-
tribution from households without children to households with children in France than in 
Germany, as it is often claimed in the German political debate.  
To address this question, we compare in the following the median of effective average tax 
rates for different household types. As Table 3 shows, the median of the effective average tax 
rate for all households is about 8.5% in France. Households without children and couples with 
one child face a higher median average tax rate, all other household types have a lower me-
dian tax burden. In Germany, the median of the average tax burden is higher, as can be seen 
from Table 4: The median of the effective tax rate is about 2 percentage points higher than in 
France and amounts to about 10.5%.18 However, there is more redistribution between house-
holds with and households without children than in France. The difference is most pro-
nounced for singles with one child, who face a median effective average tax rate of -17% in 
Germany and -1% in France. Note that this difference cannot be due to different income dis-
tributions of these two household types (see Figure 10). However, we want to stress again at 
this point, that we are only looking at the effect of the income tax system in this paper – ef-
fects of other social transfers are left aside. Tables 3 and 4 also show, that there is more redis-
tribution towards couples with two and three children in Germany.  Both groups of house-
holds face a lower median average tax rate relative to the overall population in Germany than 
in France. Therefore, in contrast to what is generally claimed in the public debate, families in 
general do not gain more under the French income tax system than under the German one. 
                                                                          
18 This is due to the fact that the income tax is more important with respect to overall tax amount in Germany than 
in France (see OECD 2004).  
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[Table 3 about here] 
[Table 4 about here] 
7  Conclusion and policy implications 
Based on a comparison of tax schedules, family components within the income tax, the defini-
tion and distribution of taxable income and the empirical distribution of effective average tax 
rates in France and Germany, we have shown that families do not gain more on average under 
the French income tax system than under the German one. Only towards families with three 
children is the French system more generous on average than the German one. 
Low income families with less than three children are faring better in terms of tax relief under 
the German system, which is due to the more generous scheme of child benefits in Germany 
as compared to France. More precisely, most of the German system is based on lump sum 
transfers because only the wealthiest households are concerned by the tax allowance. There-
fore most of households receive the same amount of money regardless of their income. On the 
contrary in France, the French system is half based on lump sum transfers (child benefits) 
while the other half is based on the gain generated by the family splitting. Compare to Ger-
many, the tax gain is more progressive (and so more unequal). Therefore, low income fami-
lies in France do not receive as much as the wealthiest ones. 
In the highest two deciles, families of all types profit more under the French system. How-
ever, this is due to the different definition of taxable income and not to the family splitting. 
The redistributive power of the family splitting is substantially weakened due to the existence 
of a ceiling of the splitting gain. Thus, family splitting per se leads to lower average tax rates 
in the French system over a large range of incomes only for families with three children. If 
Germany were to keep its tax base function, i.e. its definition of taxable income, but would 
introduce the French family splitting and the French child benefits, (which is far more likely 
than that Germany would also take over the French definition of taxable income), all house-
holds with children would on average face a higher tax burden relative to the average house-
hold than under the existing system. We can therefore refute the statement that “in general, 
families would fare better under the French system” as false. Second, low-income families of 
all types would loose most. Couples with one child would face a higher average tax rate over 
the whole range of the income distribution. Comparing the theoretical average tax rates and  
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the distribution of taxable income shows that singles with one child and couples with two 
children would face higher average tax rates up to the seventh and fifth decile, respectively. 
Families with three children would be the only ones who would profit if Germany were to 
introduce the French-style family splitting and the French child benefit scheme. They would 
face lower average tax rates from a taxable income of 15,000 Euro per year onwards. How-
ever, if it is a political goal to increase the support for families with three children, Germany 
could simply double the tax allowance for the third child and the effect would be the same.  
On the basis of the analysis presented here, we are of course not able to assess whether fami-
lies of a certain type are better off in France than in Germany, since in addition to the tax 
treatment of children, many other family policy measures such as parental leave benefits, 
housing allowances and the availability of subsidized child care, as well as indirect taxation, 
differ between the two countries. What we can say, though, is that the family splitting per se 
cannot explain different behavioural patterns in the two countries. To explain why fertility 
and maternal employment is higher in France than in Germany, one should focus attention to 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary of the most important regulations with respect to the tax treatment 
of married couples and children in France and Germany 
 
  France  Germany 
Married couples  joint taxation with income splitting; splitting divisor = 2 
Single parents  income splitting with splitting 
divisor = 1.5; the tax gain from this 
splitting has a ceiling at 1,473 Euro 
per year 
single parents’ allowance 








„Family splitting“: the splitting 
divisor is increased by 0.5 for the 
first and second, and by 1 for the 
third and every subsequent child  
the tax gain from this splitting has 
a ceiling of 2,017 Euro for the first 
and the second, and 4,034 Euro 
for the third and every subsequent 
child 
 
child allowance amounting to 
5,080 Euro per year 




4th and every subsequent child 
supplement for children aged 
more than 11 years  
supplement for children aged 
more than 16 years 
 
Einkommensabhängiger 
Zuschlag ab dem 3. Kind 
 














Cash benefits and tax gains 















Families are eligible only for 
one or other of transfer 
benefits or tax relief via the tax 




Table 2: Distribution of Households to Different Household Types 
Household Types  France  Germany 
  Number of 
observations 
in the data set
(ERF) 





the data set 
(SOEP) 
Share of the 
population 
(weighted) 
Singles without children (S+0)  18,587 32.1 % 2,592  43.4 %
Singles with one child (S+1)  2,100 3.6 % 214  2.7 %
Singles with two or more children 
(S+2+)  1,628 2.6 % 132  1.2 %
Couples without children (C+0)  19,373 29.9 % 3,135  31.6 %
Couples with one child (C+1)  7,846 12.5 % 1,032  9.1 %
Couples with two children (C+2)  8,162 12.7 % 1,136  8.8 %
Couples with three children (C+3)  3,231 4.9 % 347  3.0 %
Couples with four or more chil-
dren (C+4+)  1,188 1.8 % 83  0.5 %
Sum  61,815 100% 8,671  100%
Source: Calculations of DIW Berlin and INSEE based on the ERF (2001) and the SOEP (2002). 
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Table 3: Median of pre-tax and after-tax income and effective average tax rates for 
different household types, France 
Household type 
Effective average tax rate 
in percent 
Deviation from the median of 
all households in percentage 
points 
Singles without children  8.16 -0.35 
Singles with one child  8.45 -0.06 
Couples without children   10.03 1.52 
Couples with one child  10.81 2.30 
Couples with two children  7.12 -1.40 
Couples with three children  -3.54 -12.05 
All households  8.51  
Source: Calculations of DIW Berlin and INSEE based on the ERF 2001. 
 
 
Table 4: Median of pre-tax and after-tax income and effective average tax rates for 
different household types, Germany 
Household type 
Effective average tax rate 
in percent 
Deviation from the median of 
all households in percentage 
points 
Singles without children  10.48 0.03 
Singles with one child  -6.7 -17.15 
Couples without children   11.12 0.67 
Couples with one child  10.61 0.16 
Couples with two children  6.75 -3.7 
Couples with three children  -3.23 -13.68 
All households  10.45  
Source: Calculations of DIW Berlin and INSEE based on GSOEP 2002.  
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Appendix 2: Figures 
Figure 1: Income Tax Tariff in France (year 2001) 
Source: Calculations of DIW Berlin and INSEE. 
 
Figure 2: Income Tax Tariff in Germany (year 2001) 
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Figure 3: “Splitting gain” according to the French tax tariff (2001) 
Source: Calculations of DIW Berlin and INSEE. 
 
Figure 4: “Splitting gain” according to the German tax tariff (2001) 
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Figure 5: Theoretical average tax rates, Couples with 1 child 
Source: Calculations of DIW Berlin and INSEE. 
 
Figure 6: Theoretical average tax rates, Couples with 2 children 
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Figure 7: Theoretical average tax rates, Couples with 3 children 
Source: Calculations of DIW Berlin and INSEE. 
 
 
Figure 8: Theoretical average tax rates, Singles with 1 child 
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Figure 9: The distribution of pre-tax and taxable income in France and Germany,  























Note: D1-D9 refer to the mean of incomes in the first 9 deciles. P95 and P99 refer to the lower bound of the 
95
th and the 99
th percentile, respectively. 
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Figure 10: The distribution of pre-tax and taxable income in France and Germany, 



























Note: D1-D9 refer to the mean of incomes in the first 9 deciles. P95 and P99 refer to the lower bound of the 
95
th and the 99
th percentile, respectively. 
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Note: D1-D9 refer to the mean of incomes in the first 9 deciles. P95 and P99 refer to the lower bound of the 
95
th and the 99
th percentile, respectively. 
Source: Calculations of DIW Berlin and INSEE, based on ERF (2001) and SOEP (2002). 
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Note: Dots refer to the averages of pre-tax income and effective tax rates of the first 9 deciles and to the 
averages of pre-tax income and effective tax rates of P90-95, P95-99 and P99-100, respecctively. 































































































Figure 13: Effective average tax rates, Singles with one child 
 
Note: Dots refer to the averages of pre-tax income and effective tax rates of the first 9 deciles and to the 
averages of pre-tax income and effective tax rates of P90-95, P95-99 and P99-100, respecctively. 












































Figure 14: Effective average tax rates, Couples with one child 
 
Note: Dots refer to the averages of pre-tax income and effective tax rates of the first 9 deciles and to the 
averages of pre-tax income and effective tax rates of P90-95, P95-99 and P99-100, respecctively. 



















































Figure 15: Effective average tax rates, Couples with two children 
 
Note: Dots refer to the averages of pre-tax income and effective tax rates of the first 9 deciles and to the 
averages of pre-tax income and effective tax rates of P90-95, P95-99 and P99-100, respecctively. 























































Figure 16: Effective average tax rates, Couples with three children 
 
Note: Dots refer to the averages of pre-tax income and effective tax rates of the first 9 deciles and to the 
averages of pre-tax income and effective tax rates of P90-95, P95-99 and P99-100, respecctively. 
Source: Calculations of DIW Berlin and INSEE on the basis of  ERF (2001) and SOEP (2002). 
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